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This is a very difficult paper for me to comment on for two reasons. The first
reason is that Haidar and Reygadas have a monumental grasp of the vast
range of literature that has come to be known as Argumentation Theory. I do
not mean that they are somewhat familiar with the core material as published in
the last thirty years in such places as JAFA, Informal Logic, and Philosophy
and Rhetoric. No, their expertise goes well beyond that into all aspects of
Linguistics, Communication Theory, Discourse Analysis, and all aspects of
philosophy that impinge upon the considerations we have been undertaking.
Commenting on their assessment of the details and relevant aspects of these
diverse undertakings is well beyond my meagre scholarly resources. Given the
choice of spending several years catching up in order to check on their
statements and verify their citations or taking their word for it, I choose trust.
The second difficulty, surely a happier one, is the extent to which I agree with
their conclusions. Since they come to Argumentation Theory from linguistics
they are particularly sensitized to the differences occurring in diverse
communications and have a deep awareness of how criteria of argument
evaluation can be applied differently in various circumstances. In addition, their
quite proper insistence that social status and power play a significant role in
communications may well be do to their own cultural diversity. That is, in living
in and coping with a culture where power positions, social status and social
practice are of the utmost importance, it is not surprising that one can look at
other cultures and more easily see the same process.
I want to address two main points, the first at length, the second in one
paragraph. The first is their discussion throughout their paper of the integration
of the dialectical and the rhetorical, the ideal and the real, the abstract and the
concrete within the practice of Argumentation Theory. The second is the
possibility of working out their programme given the range of diverse
approaches that need to be included.
Haidar and Reygadas point out early in their paper that no matter how much
we separate the dialectical and rhetorical approaches in theory, actual
situations "almost never exclude the rhetoric[al] components of emotion and
ethos, the persuasive strategies" (ms. p.6). They remind us (ms. p 9) that even
though we focus on one aspect or use one analytical tool, that argumentation is
"a real total and continuous process," which we arbitrarily slice and dice for
scholarly purposes. The social psychologist focuses, because of her interest
and training on, perhaps, the social dynamics of goal establishment, while the
informal logician takes that same interaction, ignores the social setting and
instead maps out the relationship between premisses and conclusions. Each
of them models something of significance to the complete package, but each
of them must hold in their minds that it is one of a multitude of aspects that are
going on simultaneously.
In reviewing the various fields and sub fields which all examine the human
process called ‘argumentation,’ we get a sense of just how diverse they are
and of how many distinct approaches exist. Of course, the almost universal
drive that lies behind all this research is the fundamental belief that
argumentation is a better way of maintaining civilized relations between people
than any other. But argumentation, in and of itself, does not necessarily avoid
strife – rather it is good argumentation that does that. Consequently, there is
frequently a strong normative component in various approaches, and
sometimes the normative is confused or conflated with the descriptive. Virtually
every contributing field has a descriptive aspect. This is true even of what is
perhaps the most normative, Critical Thinking, because the identification and
layout of premisses and conclusions is, arguably, descriptive.
The problem, however, goes back to the first issue, viz., actual situations differ
from theoretical ones. In fact, real argument situations are extremely
idiosyncratic, as is localized language usage, which creates difficulties for both
the descriptive and normative programmes. The descriptive programmes are
hampered because they require some degree of uniformity in order to draw out
generalities. If there is no uniformity, then what is being described that is
applicable across contexts? The normative has difficulties because rules of
procedure need to be consistent across different situations. This flies in the
face of the simple fact that social and cultural customs differ from language
group to language group. Moreover, depending on how such groups are
delimited, the result can end with very small user groups and very fine
distinctions. That is, the shared communication tools used by a group of
language users might be uniquely instantiated by any number of sub-groups. A
small group of friends or a spousal pair might use the larger group’s language
in such a way as to make it impossible to interpret the communication, let
alone determine if it is following normative rules. (vide, Willard, 1976, 1989.)
Haidar and Reygadas say that we must abandon universality and recognize
that "there is a big gap between ideal critical contexts and the real life contexts
affected by subject’s emotion, power, culture and ideology" (ms. p. 11). If we
are going to apply standards of rationality, then we need to know what they
mean. "In everyday life discussion what is valid somewhere is not always valid
everywhere" (ms. p. 14). This means that we need to examine the actual
situation much more closely by understanding not only the linguistic
conventions currently in play, but also the logical and social as well.
Universalizing from the familiar or the local does not always result in legitimate
normative ideals. Grice (1975), for example, has as one of his rules of
conversation that one ought not provide more information than is needed to
answer a question or make a response. Yet there are cultures in which saying
the minimum is considered curt, and conversational contributions trimmed to
contain only what is necessary to answer the question would be misunderstood
as well as being thought rude.
Yet the question must be asked, Can we usefully work in a field where we have
come to believe that universalizing will not work, and that every situation we
want to study might have characteristics that make it unique? I believe the
answer is, yes, but it will not be easy. The undertaking requires the humanizing
of Argumentation Theory so that it inevitably includes the uniqueness inherent
in human activity. So, whatever criteria we develop must be seen as flexible
and variable depending on the context: Rationality is not universal, it is
situational. It is situational rationality that we use when we make decisions,
even if lurking somewhere behind there is a generalized sense of criteria we
could agree to share. Thus, as Haidar & Reygadas and Gilbert (1997) allow,
the R-S-A, relevance-sufficiency-acceptability criteria may well serve useful
ends, but it cannot be applied without paying attention to the details of the
situation. In Coalescent Argumentation, I provide an example (p. 97) which
illustrates that several people can use totally different levels of evidence to
accept or reject the injunction to avoid the sun depending on who they are, and
what are their goals, needs, desire and motives.
Somewhere Willard writes about the everyday rationality that gets us up, out of
the house, and to the colloquium on time. We make constant decisions,
resolve hundreds of issues, and cleverly choose the best alternative. When we
argue a lot of this becomes public, and when there is disagreement there are
challenges and defenses. It is then that we require situational rationality to be
studied. There is nothing wrong with saying that a response must be relevant,
just in how that relevance manifests itself. Eavesdropping on a culture that
relies, say, heavily on story-telling, that relevance might be elusive to some.
That does not mean it is not there.
The second question I raised is, given the huge diversity of approaches, can
we foresee a common Argumentation Theory that incorporates either bits and
pieces or whole theoretical frameworks into a totality? The answer is, I do not
know. I have certainly, over the twenty-odd years that I have been pondering
these issues, seen a degree of integration and cross fertilization between a
number of fields. The conferences we attend that are at the core of
Argumentation Theory are highly inter-disciplinary, but I feel there is still a long
way to go. In particular, the tension between the disciplines that want to tell us
how we ought do something and those that tell how we do something is
extreme. The gap between universalizing and contextualizing must somehow
be bridged.
There is more. An integrated Argumentation Theory not only requires training in
a diversity of disciplines, but an ability to integrate all that material into a
comprehensive approach. It is actually interesting to imagine a graduate
programme dedicated to Argumentation Theory and consider what resources
would be included from various independent disciplines. It’s not at all clear to
me that one could do so without requiring all the background one now needs to
do Linguistics, Communication Theory, Social Psychology, Philosophy, and
what have you. Could such a programme be designed? What would be the
result? Would we have experts in ADR? Researchers in Argumentation
Theory? Rivalries between quantitative and normative outlooks? Because we
must, of course, remember that the mere fact that a number of approaches fall
under a common rubric such as Psychology or Economics in no way means
that they are not at each other’s throats!
The possibilities of programme design are unlimited, but I will not pursue them
now. For now it suffices to join Haidar and Reygadas in urging researchers to
look further than the limits of their specialties and to aim at an inclusion and
integration that may move the field forward in creative ways.
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